留學(xué)生能源經(jīng)濟(jì)分析dissertation

歐盟未能影響未來照明的政策設(shè)計(jì)
 

2000年的歐洲理事會，歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在里斯本商定了計(jì)劃，以改善歐盟的性能，來應(yīng)對多種經(jīng)濟(jì)，社會和環(huán)境問題。 2000年里斯本戰(zhàn)略概述了確定未來十年過渡狀態(tài)的總體戰(zhàn)略。具體而言，工會接受了新的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)“成為在全球最具競爭力和活力的知識經(jīng)濟(jì)，能夠?yàn)榭沙掷m(xù)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長提供更多更好的就業(yè)機(jī)會和更大的社會凝聚力”（歐洲議會，2001）。這個定義目的可以分解成幾個關(guān)鍵類別的多國改善：知識驅(qū)動型，成長型，社會統(tǒng)一和經(jīng)濟(jì)競爭力。雖然早期的舉措把重點(diǎn)放在一個單一的歐盟市場的發(fā)展，這一新舉措是推動了旨在克服目前歐盟特征表現(xiàn)（博拉斯，2009：118）的競爭和戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的滯后狀態(tài)。根據(jù)所建立的成員國之間正在進(jìn)行的普遍期嚴(yán)格預(yù)定的方針，提出了這樣的進(jìn)步。監(jiān)督被轉(zhuǎn)移到了歐洲委員會和開始實(shí)施計(jì)劃。  
 

EU Failure Illuminating Influence For Future Policy Design

 

During the European council of Lisbon in the year 2000, European leaders agreed upon a plan to improve the European Union’s performance and cope with several economic, social, and environmental problems. The 2000 Lisbon Strategy outlined the overarching strategy which defined the state of transition in the coming decade. In particular, the union embraced a new strategic goal ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European Parliament, 2001). This definition of purpose can be disintegrated into several key categories of multi-national improvement: knowledge-driven, growth oriented, socially unified, and economically competitive. While earlier initiatives had focused on the development of a single EU marketplace, this new initiative was driven by competition and strategic objectives that were designed to overcome the lagging state which was currently characterising EU performance (Borras, 2009:118). Such progress was proposed according to exacting, predetermined guidelines that established a universal expectation of progress amongst member nations. Oversight was relegated to the European Commission and the programme implementation began.

 

The main goals of the strategy were to be accomplished by the year 2010, and each member nation got to decide how to reach them. The European Parliament (2001) reassured member nations that no new process was necessary in the administration of these particular objectives, they were to simply participate within the Luxembourg ‘Broad Economy Policy Guidelines’ that were simplified and revised for this particular programme. In order to monitor progress and identify those areas where deficient performance was controllable, annual meetings of the committee were proposed, allowing policymakers to review and revise any challenging areas. Oversight for the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy was maintained by the European Commission while member nations were responsible for achievement of the specific programme objectives (Steurer, 2010:73). In fact, the European Commission (2001) reported that the programme itself would establish an open method for coordination at all levels, placing responsibility for guidance squarely on the shoulders of the European Commission.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

This paper aims to find out to what degree the Lisbon strategy was a success. In order to further detail the faults and opportunities associated with the Lisbon Strategy, it is essential to compare expected performance to the actual performance of a participant nation within this system. How well did countries perform?, what went wrong, and what went right?, and where did the problems come from and how can they be avoided in the future?

 

Since the scope of this thesis does not allow looking at the performance of all countries enlisted in the Lisbon strategy, only one country will be looked upon. This country will be the Netherlands. A country which has had some interesting developments on the different goals stated in the Lisbon strategy. Looking at the main goal competitiveness, one can see that the Netherlands has had a history of being one of the highest ranked countries on the World Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum. In recent years however, this position has steadily declined while one would, in the light of the Lisbon strategy, expect this position would be consolidated or even improved.

 

In the following chapters, this thesis will first address the strategy and its goals, abstracting several measures for which performance can be tested. Second it will analyse the performance of the Netherlands and what they did to reach the goals. Finally, the performance will be analyzed by means of empirical data and benchmarked against other EU countries.

 

PART II; Theory

 

The Lisbon Strategy

 

The Lisbon Strategy was designed to facilitate the transition from the EU as a participative, collective marketplace to a competitive, advanced participant within the increasingly global economy. From employment to economic reform to social cohesion, the primary objectives of this strategy were designed to advance multinational performance at the very roots of the EU society (European Commission, 2001). One of the primary realisations in the development of this strategy was that the future of economy and competition was based on knowledge-driven competencies, skills, and capabilities. Common within such a knowledge economy was the advancement of technology, education, and labour participation,.

 

Strategically, goals were defined in order to focus on revising programmes for knowledge management infrastructures, enhancing innovation, reforming the diverse economic climate, improving social welfare, and standardising educational systems. The current macroeconomic outlook for the EU was positive, as monetary policy was currently supported by sound fiscal policies and wage moderation, inflation and interest rates were low. Unfortunately, over 15 million Europeans were out of work, the employment rate was extremely low and there was inadequate participation by various social groups including women and older workers. The services sector had yet to be developed and there was limited support for advanced technologies and research and development from both the private and public sectors.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

The Lisbon Strategy imposed specific objectives related to the transition from a market driven economy to a knowledge driven economy. From extended information exchange to greater emphasis on R&D to an expedited process of structural reform amongst various institutions, the Strategy was designed with growth and sustainable development in mind. Jones (2005:249) argues that the Lisbon Strategy recognised that people were the EU’s greatest resource, a standard which would govern all initiatives over the first several years of evaluation and revision. Yet eventually, strategy and economic growth focus would reduce the focus on people as the primary means of advancing this diverse economic system. Instead information networks, technology, and advanced industries would become priority components in various revisions of this Strategy.

 

Borras (2009:97) reports that in the first years following the implementation of various Lisbon-inspired strategies, nations failing to meet specific objectives were singled out in a formal ‘naming and shaming’ process, highlighted at regular committee meetings. By 2005, however, such administrative oversight by the European Commission was determined to not be conducive to the successful implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, and the revision of standard practices would place greater emphasis on politics and facilitating change (Borras, 2009:101). The failure of these early efforts at administrative control would ultimately handicap the Lisbon Strategy, reducing the support of EU residents and contributing to confusion over the procedural standards for advancement. In its post-2005 revision, Borras (2009:112) reports that the political appeal of the European Commission began to improve, emphasising ideological and normative leverage in order to unfold specific, tangible procedures amongst member nations. From public to governmental support, the resultant adjustments to the implementation of this strategy were much more successful than the previous five years of stagnation.

 

Summarizing this all leads to the conclusion that the Lisbon strategy had several goals and objectives, all with a great deal of ambition. Primarily, the EU had to become;

 

Most competitive, which should be achieved by increasing

 

Knowledge-based competencies, skills, and capabilities. To improve this knowledge base, two things are needed;

 

An increase in Research and Development (R&D) and

 

Changes on the labour market (more education, participation and employment)

 

In the next sections, these subjects will be elaborated upon from the bottom up, which will lead to the finding of key variables used to measure the performance on the different objectives.

 

The Labour Market

 

As human capital is a significant component in the development of a knowledge culture and competency-driven economy, the Lisbon Strategy placed particular emphasis on equalisation of labour and relative improvement in accessibility and standards across the European Union. Three key areas of reference in the design of strategic objectives in the Lisbon Strategy included unemployment, social exclusion and poverty (European Parliament, 2001). The Lisbon strategy outlined a specific labour improvement strategy which was designed to establish conditions for full employment and strengthen the regional cohesion across this socio-economic conglomerate (European Parliament, 2001). Yet in order to overcome many of the deficiencies with the current EU workforce, advances in labour training and education would be necessary, requiring active knowledge acquisition systems.

 

Jones (2005:255-57) proposes that there are several key institutions within the labour force that play a fundamental role in facilitating sustainable change: early childhood education, quality of standards in vocational training, emphasis on higher education and industry collaboration, and lifetime training programmes.

 

Education

 

In order to develop a functional and successful workforce, educational standards across the European Union needed to be reformed. The Lisbon Strategy recognised that there were particular demands based on a knowledge society that would ultimately require enhanced learning and training opportunities (European Parliament, 2001). Such comprehensive programmes were deemed a necessity for all individuals at various stages of their career path, specifically surmounting the challenge of obsolete skill sets and advanced specialisation of labour. The key targets established by the Lisbon Treaty included the following (European Parliament, 2001):

 

A significant increase in per capita investment in human resources

 

Halving of the number of 18 to 24 year olds with only lower-secondary level education

 

Online link of schools and training centres, including centralised multi-purpose learning centres designed to provide scholastic partnerships across the networked system.

 

Strategise regarding improved mobility for students, teachers, and training and research staff in order to reduce system obstacles and attract a high quality teaching staff.

 

The establishment of a standardised curricula vitae to be implemented on a voluntary, universal basis in order to ensure consistent knowledge assessment and maintain similar education, training, and operational standards

 

Employment

 

The Lisbon Strategy proposed that the Luxembourg Process was an essential and substantive programme that could be used to overcome many of the current deficiencies in employment guidelines across the Union (European Parliament, 2001). The leverage of this particular programme in the implementation of new job development initiatives would also ultimately reduce the requirements for development of new guidelines. Within the active employment policy, the Lisbon Agenda recognised that social partners including local authorities, agencies, and industry representatives should play a key role in developing the National Employment Action Plans. In order to improve upon job development, the following key areas of revision were proposed (European Parliament, 2001):#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Improve employability and reduce skills gaps by providing employment services across an electronic database regarding jobs and learning opportunities.

 

Prioritise lifelong learning as a fundamental component in European society, developing agreements amongst social partners regarding innovation and skill set specificity. From incentives to scheduling strategy, such proposals were directed towards a more active and supportive working environment.

 

Increase service employment, developing a labour market to fill private, public, or third-sector positions.

 

Participation

 

One of the primary objectives of the Lisbon Strategy was the development of social protections and a more inclusive workforce, in turn reducing unemployment and expanding job opportunities to a wider working population. Key to the job development process was the deterioration of many of the barriers which had continued to reduce participation by female employees within the EU workforce. In order to overcome such deficient statistics, explicit objectives were defined by the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, the employment of male workers was to be increased from an average of 61% in 2000 to an average of 70% by 2010. For female employees, these figures were to increase from 51% in 2000 to over 60% by 2010. Such proposals were designed to improve social protection and reduce discrimination in the workplace.

 

Research and Development

 

Research and development is one of the primary mechanisms for gaining advanced competencies, knowledge, and market position within a competitive globalised economic system. The Lisbon Strategy was committed to the universal transition towards a competitive knowledge-based economy. Emphasising digital technologies, infrastructure development was prioritised, suggesting that in order to overcome much of the information exclusion which was dominant in regions of the EU, accessibility needed to become universal (European Parliament, 2001). The problem encountered early in the rollout of this strategy was that the workforce was inadequate and inefficient, detracting from the success of advanced R&D initiatives. To leverage intrinsic knowledge capital and develop an advanced, innovative infrastructure, the Lisbon Strategy also proposed the support for private research investment and programme development through tax policies, venture capital, and government subsidies (European Parliament, 2001). In an attempt to circumvent many of the intellectual properties laws which had traditionally detracted from the protection of European patents, a joint office was proposed, establishing a centralised, community patent that was legally binding and supportive of diverse EU projects (European Parliament, 2001).

 

By 2001, review of the performance of EU nations suggested that the Lisbon Strategy had failed to stimulate sufficient investment in research and development to achieve a competitive international status for the Union (European Commission, 2001a). In fact, the research showed that when benchmarked against the United States, the EU was not only failing to invest similar financial resources in R&D, but as a whole, the Union had failed to pursue frontier technologies and advanced skill sets. Confirmation of such findings was again reported by the Commission in 2003 as the performance of member nations benchmarked according the Lisbon Strategy was deemed insufficient although potentially achievable. In fact, these findings reported that although many of the objectives had not been met, the Lisbon Strategy was still considered the most viable mechanism for meeting long term growth and development objectives (European Commission, 2003). Consequentially, there was limited diversion from this original plan, and in spite of all nations failing to meet their R&D guidelines, no adjustments were made to the accounting expectations.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

The European Commission (2001b) collected a wide range of statistical data to demonstrate the competitive position of the EU when compared directly with the top international competitors (Japan and the US). This research showed that in spite of substantial improvements in the year 2000, the EU continued to lag behind both nations in many categories including internet access, research and development investment, exports of high tech products, venture capital, and relative price levels. Such findings did indicate a trend of progress across many of these categories; however, the growth could not be considered sustainable given the relatively short recording period. In research and development, a 2003 European Commission review suggested that there were a maximum of five researchers per 1000 people working in comparison with eight in the US and nine in Japan. Public expenditure on research and development as a whole had only marginally increased since the initiation of the Lisbon Strategy, remaining close to the 1.9% of GDP benchmark that had been reached in the 1990s (EC, 2003).

 

Internet, Technology, and Advancement

 

Accessibility to information and advanced knowledge systems were a priority within the Lisbon Strategy, pursuing incidental growth in skills and competencies within the EU that would facilitate long term economic growth. De Bruijn and Lagendijk (2005:1155) argue that although the Lisbon Strategic intent of creating a centralised European Research Area was theoretically opportune, the reality of success through such initiatives was much lower than expected. Their argument revolves around the innate historical progression of knowledge and skill sets, suggesting that such growth is temporal in nature and not necessarily geographic (De Bruijn and Lagendijk, 2005:1156). Yet fundamental in endogenous growth, innovation is a precursor to knowledge development and the advancement of more technologically diverse business processes. De Bruijn and Lagendijk (2005:1170) would present empirical evidence to suggest that although magnanimous in intent, the Lisbon objectives were overly-ambitious and failed to establish appropriate advancement within the various regions of EU research and development. As previously argued, failed accountability, poorly constructed guidelines, and inaccurate expectations were the direct result of the Strategy’s failure in this area.

 

PART III; ANALYSIS

 

When looking at part II, it is obvious that the Lisbon strategy was a very ambitious plan with many goals. A great deal of those goals however, is rather vague and hard to quantify. Again, the scope of this thesis does not allow to elaborate on these measures even further. This leads to the selection of several goals that are reasonably well to quantify. Fortunately, almost every goal and sub-goal abstracted has at least one usable measure, which makes it possible to construct a fairly representative picture of the performance of countries according to the Lisbon strategy at its full scope. Only for the goals on employment, data was not available. Therefore the change in unemployment percentage will be addressed.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

This part will first look at the performance of the Netherlands on the selected criteria benchmarked against the other countries of the EU-15. Second, this performance will be evaluated and analyzed, which makes it possible to find reasons for the relative decay of the Netherlands’ competitiveness and to draw conclusions on the effect and/or implementations of the strategy.

 

The performance analysis will start with analyzing one of the primary indicators of any potential success of the Lisbon Strategy in any country; the annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore there is the performance on the goals formulated by the strategy;

 

Labour market

 

Education

 

A significant increase in per capita investment in human resources.

 

Halving of the number of 18 to 24 year olds with only lower-secondary level education.

 

Employment

 

Improve employability and reduce skills gaps by providing employment services across an electronic database regarding jobs and learning opportunities.

 

Participation

 

Employment of male workers increase from an average of 61% to 70%

 

Employment of female workers increase from 51% to over 60%

 

Research and Development

 

3% of total government expenditure is spent on R&D

 

Increased accessibility to information and advanced knowledge systems

 

Performance

 

In order to see how well the Netherlands performed on the several key areas of the strategy, this section will graphically represent data on the goals deducted above. To demonstrate the net impact of Lisbon Strategy revisions on the overall financial performance of the EU-15, it is important to look at the pre and post Lisbon performance. The data represented will be benchmarked to the other countries of the EU-15 in order to validate the overall performance against the tenets of the Lisbon Strategy.

 

Growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

 

Probably the most primary indicator of measuring any potential success in any country is the annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP). Figure 1 details the World Bank (2010) recorded data for the past decade, highlighting disparate performance from the expectations of a strategy focused on economic growth. It is obvious from this visual that in the period immediately preceding the Lisbon Strategy, economic growth in the Netherlands averaged around 4.30% annually. While there are specific reasons other than the Lisbon Strategy implementation that can be attributed to the subsequent decline in GDP growth, the fact that this statistic has yet to retrace to its previously held levels is an indication of struggling programme objectives. In 1999, the Euro was introduced into the EU, signalling revaluation of national performance indicators, potentially contributing to an artificial decline in reported GDP growth. In 2001, the United States endured the 9/11 terror attacks and the global financial markets were thrown into speculative hesitancy. While minor gains were made in GDP growth from 2002 through 2005, the only real improvements occurred in the period following the revision of the Lisbon Strategy (2006 and later).#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Figure : Annual Netherlands GDP Growth % (Source: World Bank, 2010)

 

When benchmarking the achievements on economic growth that the Netherlands have accomplished, one can see that the problems extent to the whole EU-15 area. In figure 3, it is obvious that the growth rate for EU-15 nations over the past decade has been variable both in percentage and direction. The European Commission (2002) recognises that in the periods following the terror attacks on the United States in September of 2001, there was a significant, negative impact on financial performance in the EU. It is this intimate connection between the two economic systems that has proven so difficult to surmount, as the establishment of the Euro and the global financial uncertainty surrounding 9/11 influenced growth and performance across all EU nations. Appendix A offers the numerical representation of the average percentage change in GDP for the EU-15 since 1998. There is a clear and remarkable trend which is visible once the 2002 recovery period in a post 9/11 economic climate was entered.

 

Figure : Annual Percentage of GDP Growth for EU-15 Nations (Source: World Bank, 2010)

 

What is immediately obvious from this visual representation is that there has yet to be such significant growth for several nations (Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain) as experienced during the pre-Lisbon Strategy operational period. The average growth rate for all nations during this ten year period was around 2.95%. While several nations outpaced such performance (i.e. Ireland 6.37%, Luxemburg 4.83%), the performance trend for all nations remains relatively in concert with this average percentage. As the Euro was rolled out in full force in 1999, there is an obvious performance disparity in 1999 and 2000 when compared with other accounting years. This differentiated valuation is most likely a direct result of the revised value of the national currencies into a singular European currency.

 

2001 and 2002, on the other hand, demonstrate the retracement of such uncharacteristic gains in GDP, as the average increase for all nations was around 2.22% and 1.91% respectively. The downturn continued into 2003 where the average increase in GDP was only 1.59%. There is no solid indicator based on these findings that the Lisbon Strategy has had any significant impact on the overall economic performance of any of these industry participants. Following 2005 when the second-stage revision of this plan was enacted, there is a greater inclination in GDP percentage, as in 2006, the gains averaged 3.61% and in 2007, this number was around 3.19%. Yet the international recession which occurred as a direct result of the US/UK credit crunch would ultimately undermine such gains in 2008, bringing negative GDP growth for several nations including Ireland, Italy, and Denmark.

 

Education

 #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

To create a more flexible workforce, changes on the labour market were vital. One of these changes was to better educate the workforce, so that workers could better adjust to new circumstances or switch jobs easily. In order to do so, investment in human resources was of the essence. De strategy’s goal was that each country would make a “significant increase in per capita investment in human resources”. It is not clear what is meant with significant, so the only way to measure performance on this goal is compare the performance of the different countries.

 

Figure 4 shows the yearly spending on human recourses as a percentage of GDP per nation, including a graph of the total average of the EU-15 area.

 

Figuur 4: Total spending on human resources as a percentage of GDP (Source: Eurostat, 2010)

 

As can be seen from figure 4, investments on human resources in the EU-15 have not seen a great deal of development. Most countries had either a small increase or decrease of their percentage spending on human resources. Looking at the Netherlands we can see that after the implementation of the Lisbon strategy investments in human resources increased with small steps every year. After 2004 this process was reversed leading the country to end up half a percentage point higher than before. For EU-15 region as a whole, total spending on human resources is almost a straight line from year to year, moving up and down within a band of 0.3 percentage point.

 

Yet another criterion to improve knowledge and skills across the union was to increase the number of workers with more than just lower secondary education. The focus of achieving this was laid on the group of young people of 18 to 24 years old. This groups drop-out level needed to decrease with the ultimate goal of “Halving of the number of 18 to 24 year olds with only lower-secondary level education”.

 

Figuur 5: Students with ISCED level 2 between 20-24 (Source: Eurostat, 2010)

 

Figure 5 shows the development of the number of students with only ISCED level 2 education. ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education and is developed by UNESCO in 1970. It measures the standards for education in countries making it possible to compare education internationally (UNESCO, 1997). Since data was limited for most countries and not available according to the exact group size, figure 5 shows data of the number of students with ISCED level 2 (lower secondary education) between 20 and 24 in six nations. Again the Netherlands perform relatively well compared to their peers, with a slow but steady decrease in the number of lower educated youth.

 

Employment

 

The vague goals formulated on employment lead to the impossibility of measuring them. Because employment is very important in the strategy we will compare the development of unemployment ratios across countries.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Unemployment is one of the most significant indicators of potential progress for the Lisbon Strategy. Considering its primary position within the development of the strategic foundations of this initiative, the reduction in unemployment throughout the EU would indicate a positive trend and provide tangible evidence of programme successes. The unemployment rate in the Netherlands has seen significant improvement since the 2000 initiation of the Lisbon Strategy. Evolving from 5.5% in 2006 to 4.25% in 2009, the labour force initiatives currently in place within this nation are continuing to improve the working prospects of all citizens. Yet the European Commission (2010) suggests that such low unemployment is artificial in this marketplace and predicts that it will increase in the coming years.

 

Figure 6 highlights the change in unemployment across all of the EU-15 during this decade. Appendix C offers calculations of the percentage change in unemployment over the past decade, indicating any relative progress in this category since the inception of the Lisbon Strategy. While unemployment in 1997 was at an average of 9.26% for the entirety of the EU-15, by 2008, this figure had decreased to 7.16%. Led by high unemployment in nations such as Spain (12.52%) and Greece (9.83%) there was hardly a competitive change in this category over the past decade.

 

Figuur : Unemployment Percentage and Change since Lisbon (Source: World Bank, 2010)

 

Participation

 

In order to further validate the achievement of the principles of the Lisbon Strategy, it is important to evaluate progress, if any, in the area of social exclusion and male-female working equity. Figures 7 and 8 detail the change in male and female activity rate for the EU-15 countries since 1998. In Appendix D, this relationship is numerically divided, highlighting improvement and failure within this programme over the past decade. From the figures can be seen that for male activity, the performance doesn’t change significantly for most countries while for female activity there is an overall steady increase.

 

Looking at the two goals for activity it is obvious that these goals were not as prudent for the Netherlands as they were for other countries. Where the total workforce participation of 70% was a primary Lisbon objective, in 2003, the Netherlands had already met this expectation at 73.6% of their population, culminating in 2007 figures which report a 76.0% inclusion rate. For female workers, the Lisbon Objective was set at a 60% inclusion rate, a figure which was also accomplished in 2003 with 66.0% of the female population employed. Currently, this figure stands at 69.6% and has been incrementally increasing over the past decade. The European Commission (2010), however, argues that such achievements are misleading as they fail to note the high percentage of the population that is in part time labour, reducing the overall participation rate in terms of hours as previously highlighted.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Figuur 6: Active male Population (Source: Eurostat, 2010)

 

Figuur 7: Active female Population (Source: Eurostat, 2010)

 

Research and Development

 

Probably the most important goal of the Lisbon strategy was to make a significant increase in technology standards. To catch up with the technology standard in the US and other countries, a constant flow if investments was needed. The goal set on the increase in R&D investments was 3% of annual government expenditures.

 

Figure 8 shows the Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD). As can be seen, the goal of 3% annual government investment on R&D in not once met by any country. For the Netherlands holds that these expenditures even decreased throughout the past decade.

 

Figuur 8: Total GBAORD as a % of total general government expenditure (Source: Eurostat, 2010)

 

In addition to the goals of investing more in R&D, the European Commission notes that the most important technological advancement of the past decade is the development of internet. It gives increased accessibility to information and advanced knowledge systems.

 

In addition to earlier improvements, the Netherlands have also outpaced the Euro zone, achieving 74% saturation in broadband internet provision for their residents. Such a percentage of citizens with access to this resource is increased from 54% in 2005. Nearly all of the Netherlands’ educational institutions have gained access to the internet, and ICT has become a priority initiative, focusing on a virtual knowledge network now accessible by primary and secondary schools. Yet another principle driving the Lisbon Strategy was the expansion and improvement of technological advancement throughout the EU-15. Figure 9 details the net impact of such initiatives on the growth of the internet throughout these nations, highlighting a rapid and sustainable growth in such technology since 1999. There are two different measurements of performance in this industry including the bit transfer rate per person and the overall internet bandwidth. There is a statistically relevant difference between performances in these two categories which will be further explored in this analysis. First, the growth in bits per person (BPP) has been significant since the Lisbon Strategy was implemented in 2000. Appendix F highlights the relative growth in bandwidth by nation over this decade, a measurement which was not even recorded prior to 1999.

 

The statistical reality demonstrated by the raw data collected from the period since the Lisbon Strategy is that over the entirety of the EU-15, there was a growth in BPP bandwidth of an average of 2,356.73%. While some nations such as Portugal (6,022.14%) experienced a much more significant growth than others, the data highlights a successful and progress-driven advancement within the internet infrastructure of this Union. Both the Netherlands and Belgium grew at rates below 1,000% with gains of 846.19 and 825.09% respectively. Of primary concern in the Lisbon Strategy was the installation of advanced technology and improvement in international competition in this category. Luxembourg characterises such remarkable growth during this period; however, only within the last two years. Through the installation of its state of the art infrastructure which includes fibre optic data systems, this nation quickly became the dominant provider of high speed internet in the EU-15 (LICT, 2010). In fact, the growth of Luxembourg’s internet infrastructure required that 2007 and 2008 internet bandwidth performance be excluded from this analysis because of the significant disparity between ’06 and ’08. The growth in BPP bandwidth in Luxembourg actually equated to a 1 million percent increase over 2000 performance figures.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Figure 9: Growth in Internet Bandwidth (Bits per Person) (Source: World Bank, 2010)

 

While the bandwidth per person highlights the speed of accessibility that has been provided to EU-15 residents, the comparison of such data with the speed capabilities of the new electronic infrastructure will highlight the relative inclusion of EU social members within this technological framework. Figure 6 details the growth in bandwidth across these Union members since 1999 when the recording period first began. Appendix F reports the numerical data for comparison of the BPP and the Mbps during this same period. What is immediately obvious from comparison of the percentage change between 2007 and 2000 is that there has been a significantly greater improvement in band width per person than there has been in the actual megabyte transfer rate per second (with the exception of Luxembourg). For example, in Spain, while BPP grew by over 71,000%, the Mbps only increased by 4,000%. This evidence suggests that as planned during the Lisbon Strategy, the accessibility of internet resources by EU residents has outpaced growth in the infrastructure itself. While these figures are representative of significant gains in bandwidth improvement over the past decade, the majority of major increases have been made between 2005 and 2007. In fact, it is also only during this period that the accessibility to the internet service for EU citizens has been optimised to its current levels. Prior to this period, bandwidth capabilities had improved at a much more rapid rate than bits per person.

 

Figuur : International Internet Bandwidth (MBPS) (Source: World Bank, 2010)

 

Evaluation

 

When looking at the goals of the Lisbon strategy and the performance on these goals by the Netherlands, one would expect that this country would score high on the competitiveness ladder. As stated in the introduction however, the Netherlands have made fall in relative competitiveness. This section tries to explain how it is possible that, although the Netherlands outperformed several of its close competitors on the Global Competitiveness Index on most goals of the Lisbon strategy, it still fell on the index. Furthermore, we have seen that the overall performance of the EU-15 area has lacked to reach the goals, sometimes by far. This leads to questioning the setup and implementation of the strategy.