Research Paper代寫范文：The Strategic Rationale For Outsourcing Decisions

Research Paper代寫范文-外包決策的戰(zhàn)略依據(jù)。本文是一篇本站提供的research paper代寫參考范文，主要內(nèi)容是將投資和精力集中在企業(yè)最好的工作上，從而擴(kuò)大內(nèi)部資源的回報(bào)。其次，如果核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力發(fā)展良好，一家公司可以為目前和即將到來的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手提供驚人的障礙，這些競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手希望進(jìn)入公司感興趣的領(lǐng)域，從而幫助和保護(hù)“市場(chǎng)份額”的戰(zhàn)略優(yōu)勢(shì)。第三，可以想象，最大的杠桿作用是全面部署外部承包商、投資、創(chuàng)新和專業(yè)能力，這些能力是無法負(fù)擔(dān)的，甚至不可能在內(nèi)部復(fù)制。第四，在快速變化的市場(chǎng)和技術(shù)環(huán)境中，這種合作戰(zhàn)略降低了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，縮短發(fā)現(xiàn)和制造周期，減少投資，并更好地響應(yīng)客戶需求。下面就一起來看一下這篇research paper代寫范文的具體內(nèi)容。

By reviewing the relative and risks of “making or buying”, firms can persuade their expertise and resources for improved profitability. Combining two strategic approaches accurately permit managers to coordinate their companies’ skills and resources efficiently beyond levels obtainable with other strategies.

通過審查“制造或購(gòu)買”的相對(duì)性和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，企業(yè)可以說服他們的專業(yè)知識(shí)和資源來提高盈利能力。將兩種戰(zhàn)略方法準(zhǔn)確地結(jié)合起來，可以使管理者有效地協(xié)調(diào)公司的技能和資源，超越其他戰(zhàn)略所能達(dá)到的水平。

1- Concentrate company’s possessed resources on its “core competencies” through which the company can achieve definable incomparability and offer “unique value” for customers. (Quinn, and Doorley, 1990)

1-將公司擁有的資源集中在其“核心能力”上，通過這些能力，公司可以實(shí)現(xiàn)可定義的不可比性，并為客戶提供“獨(dú)特的價(jià)值”。（Quinn和Doorley，1990）

2- Outsourcing strategically other activities of the companies – consisting of many conventionally believed primary to a company – which are neither special capabilities the firm nor affect critical strategic requirements. (Quinn, 1992)

2-戰(zhàn)略性地外包公司的其他活動(dòng)——包括許多傳統(tǒng)上認(rèn)為是公司的主要活動(dòng)——這些活動(dòng)既不是公司的特殊能力，也不會(huì)影響關(guān)鍵的戰(zhàn)略要求。（奎因，1992年）

Substantial gains can be achieved from effective combining of the two approaches. Directors leverage their firm’s resources in four manners.

將這兩種方法有效結(jié)合起來可以取得實(shí)質(zhì)性成果。董事們通過四種方式利用公司的資源。

First, they expand returns on in-house resources by focusing investments and energies on the enterprise’s best jobs. Secondly, if core competencies are well-developed a company can supply astounding barriers for present and forthcoming competitors that look for entering into the company’s areas of interest, thus assisting and shielding the strategic advantages of “market share”. Third, conceivably the utmost leverage of all is the full deployment of external contractors, investments, innovations, and specialized professional capabilities that would be unaffordable or even not possible to replicate internally Fourth, in rapidly shifting marketplaces and technological circumstances, this cooperative strategy reduces risks, shortens discovery and manufacturing cycle times, decrease investments, and generates better responsiveness to customer needs. (Quinn and Hillmer 1995)

首先，他們將投資和精力集中在企業(yè)最好的工作上，從而擴(kuò)大內(nèi)部資源的回報(bào)。其次，如果核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力發(fā)展良好，一家公司可以為目前和即將到來的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手提供驚人的障礙，這些競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手希望進(jìn)入公司感興趣的領(lǐng)域，從而幫助和保護(hù)“市場(chǎng)份額”的戰(zhàn)略優(yōu)勢(shì)。第三，可以想象，最大的杠桿作用是全面部署外部承包商、投資、創(chuàng)新和專業(yè)能力，這些能力是無法負(fù)擔(dān)的，甚至不可能在內(nèi)部復(fù)制。第四，在快速變化的市場(chǎng)和技術(shù)環(huán)境中，這種合作戰(zhàn)略降低了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，縮短發(fā)現(xiàn)和制造周期，減少投資，并更好地響應(yīng)客戶需求。（Quinn和Hillmer 1995）

Earning sustainable competitive advantage through Outsourcing 通過外包獲得可持續(xù)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)

Managers can combine core competency concepts and strategic outsourcing for maximum effectiveness. Managers can analytically select and develop the core competencies that will provide the firm’s uniqueness, competitive advantage, and basis of value creation for the future.

管理者可以將核心能力概念與戰(zhàn)略外包相結(jié)合，以實(shí)現(xiàn)最大的效率。管理者可以通過分析來選擇和發(fā)展核心能力，這些能力將為公司的獨(dú)特性、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)和未來價(jià)值創(chuàng)造奠定基礎(chǔ)。

Core competency strategies 核心能力戰(zhàn)略

The basic ideas behind core competencies and strategic outsourcing have been well supported by research extending over a twenty-year period.[4] In 1974, Rumelt noted that neither of the then-favored strategies – unrelated diversification or vertical integration – yielded consistently high returns.[5] Since then, other carefully structured research has indicated the effectiveness of disaggregation strategies in many industries.[6] Noting the failures of many conglomerates in the 1960s and 1970s, both financial theorists and investors began to support more focused company concepts. Generally this meant “sticking to your knitting” by cutting back to fewer product lines. Unfortunately, this also meant a concomitant increase in the systematic risk these narrower markets represented.

核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和戰(zhàn)略外包背后的基本思想得到了長(zhǎng)達(dá)二十年的研究的有力支持。[4] 1974年，Rumelt指出，當(dāng)時(shí)青睞的兩種策略——無關(guān)的多元化或垂直整合——都沒有產(chǎn)生持續(xù)的高回報(bào)。[5] 從那時(shí)起，其他精心組織的研究表明，分解戰(zhàn)略在許多行業(yè)中是有效的。[6] 注意到20世紀(jì)60年代和70年代許多企業(yè)集團(tuán)的失敗，金融理論家和投資者都開始支持更專注的公司概念。一般來說，這意味著通過減少生產(chǎn)線來“堅(jiān)持編織”。不幸的是，這也意味著這些狹窄市場(chǎng)所代表的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隨之增加。

However, some analysts noticed that many highly successful Japanese and American companies had very wide product lines, yet were neither conglomerates nor truly vertically integrated.[7] Japanese companies, like Sony, Mitsubishi, Matsushita, or Yamaha, had extremely diverse product offerings, as did 3M or Hewlett-Packard in the United States. Yet they were not conglomerates in the normal sense. They were termed “related conglomerates,” redeploying certain key skills from market to market.[8]

然而，一些分析師注意到，許多非常成功的日本和美國(guó)公司擁有非常廣泛的產(chǎn)品線，但既不是企業(yè)集團(tuán)，也不是真正的垂直整合。[7] 索尼、三菱、松下或雅馬哈等日本公司的產(chǎn)品種類極其多樣，美國(guó)的3M或惠普也是如此。然而，它們并不是正常意義上的企業(yè)集團(tuán)。它們被稱為“相關(guān)企業(yè)集團(tuán)”，將某些關(guān)鍵技能從一個(gè)市場(chǎng)重新部署到另一個(gè)市場(chǎng)。[8]

At the same time, these companies also contracted out significant support activities. Although frequently considered vertically integrated, the Japanese auto Industry, for example, was structured around “mother companies” that primarily performed design and assembly, with a number of Independent suppliers and alliance partners – without ownership bonds to the mother companies – feeding into them.[9] Many other Japanese hi-tech companies, particularly the more Innovative ones like Sony and Honda, used comparable strategies leveraging a few core skills against multiple markets through extensive outsourcing.

與此同時(shí)，這些公司還承包了重要的支助活動(dòng)。盡管經(jīng)常被認(rèn)為是垂直整合的，但例如，日本汽車行業(yè)是圍繞著主要從事設(shè)計(jì)和組裝的“母公司”構(gòu)建的，有許多獨(dú)立供應(yīng)商和聯(lián)盟合作伙伴——與母公司沒有所有權(quán)紐帶——為其提供服務(wù)。[9] 許多其他日本高科技公司，特別是索尼和本田等更具創(chuàng)新性的公司，通過廣泛的外包，利用一些核心技能對(duì)抗多個(gè)市場(chǎng)，采用了類似的戰(zhàn)略。

The term “core competency strategies” was later used to describe these and other less diversified strategies developed around a central set of corporate skills.[10] However, there has been little theory or consistency in the literature about what “core” really means. Consequently, many executives have been understandably confused about the topic. They need not be if they think in terms of the specific skills the company has or must have to create unique value for customers. However, their analyses must go well beyond looking at traditional product or functional strategies to the fundamentals of what the company can do better than anyone else.[11]

“核心能力戰(zhàn)略”一詞后來被用來描述這些和其他圍繞一套核心企業(yè)技能發(fā)展的不太多樣化的戰(zhàn)略。[10] 然而，關(guān)于“核心”的真正含義，文獻(xiàn)中幾乎沒有理論或一致性。因此，許多高管對(duì)這個(gè)話題感到困惑是可以理解的。如果他們從公司為客戶創(chuàng)造獨(dú)特價(jià)值所具備或必須具備的特定技能來思考，那么他們就不需要這樣做。然而，他們的分析必須遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出傳統(tǒng)的產(chǎn)品或功能戰(zhàn)略，而是公司比任何人都能做得更好的基本面。[11]

For example, after some difficult times, it was easy enough for a beer company like Foster’s to decide that it should not be in the finance, forest products, and pastoral businesses into which it had diversified. It has now divested these peripheral businesses and is concentrating on beer. However, even within this concept, Foster’s true competencies are in brewing and marketing beer. Many of its distribution, transportation, and can production activities, for example, might actually be more effectively contracted out. Within individual functions like production, Foster’s could further extend its competitive advantage by outsourcing selected activities – such as maintenance or computing – where it has no unique capabilities.

例如，在經(jīng)歷了一些困難時(shí)期后，像福斯特這樣的啤酒公司很容易決定不從事其多元化經(jīng)營(yíng)的金融、森林產(chǎn)品和牧業(yè)。它現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)剝離了這些外圍業(yè)務(wù)，并專注于啤酒業(yè)務(wù)。然而，即使在這個(gè)概念中，福斯特的真正能力也是釀造和營(yíng)銷啤酒。例如，它的許多分銷、運(yùn)輸和罐頭生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)實(shí)際上可能更有效地外包出去。在生產(chǎn)等單個(gè)功能中，F(xiàn)oster’s可以通過外包選定的活動(dòng)（如維護(hù)或計(jì)算）來進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，而這些活動(dòng)并沒有其獨(dú)特的能力。

The essence of core competencies

核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的本質(zhì)

What then is really “core”? And why@ The concept requires that managers think much more carefully about which of the firm’s activities really do – or could – create unique value and which activities managers could more effectively buy externally. Careful study of both successful and unsuccessful corporate examples suggests that effective core competencies are:

那么什么才是真正的“核心”呢？為什么@這一概念要求管理者更仔細(xì)地思考公司的哪些活動(dòng)真正能夠或可能創(chuàng)造獨(dú)特的價(jià)值，以及管理者可以更有效地從外部購(gòu)買哪些活動(dòng)。仔細(xì)研究成功和不成功的企業(yè)例子表明，有效的核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力是：

1. Skill or knowledge sets, not products or functions. Executives need to look beyond the company’s products to the intellectual skills or management systems that actually create a maintainable competitive edge. Products, even those with valuable legal protection, can be too easily back-engineered, duplicated, or replaced by substitutes. Nor is a competency typically one of the traditional functions such as production, engineering sales, or finance, around which organizations were formed in the past. Instead, competencies tend to be sets of skills that cut across traditional functions.

1.技能或知識(shí)集，而非產(chǎn)品或功能。高管們需要超越公司的產(chǎn)品，著眼于真正創(chuàng)造可維持競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的智力技能或管理系統(tǒng)。產(chǎn)品，即使是那些有寶貴法律保護(hù)的產(chǎn)品，也很容易被重新設(shè)計(jì)、復(fù)制或被替代品取代。能力也不是過去組織所圍繞的傳統(tǒng)職能之一，如生產(chǎn)、工程銷售或財(cái)務(wù)。相反，能力往往是跨越傳統(tǒng)職能的一系列技能。

This interaction allows the organization consistently to perform an activity better than functional competitors and continually to Improve on the activity as markets, technology, and competition evolve. Competencies thus involve activities such as product or service design, technology creation, customer service, or logistics that tend to be based on knowledge rather than on ownership of assets or intellectual property per se. Knowledge-based activities generate most of the value in services and manufacturing.

這種互動(dòng)使組織能夠始終如一地比職能競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手更好地執(zhí)行活動(dòng)，并隨著市場(chǎng)、技術(shù)和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的發(fā)展不斷改進(jìn)活動(dòng)。因此，能力涉及產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)設(shè)計(jì)、技術(shù)創(chuàng)造、客戶服務(wù)或物流等活動(dòng)，這些活動(dòng)往往基于知識(shí)，而不是資產(chǎn)或知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)本身的所有權(quán)?；谥R(shí)的活動(dòng)產(chǎn)生了服務(wù)業(yè)和制造業(yè)的大部分價(jià)值。

In services, which account for 79 percent of all jobs and 76 percent of all value-added in the United States, intellectual inputs create virtually all of the value-added. Banking, financial services, advertising, consulting, accounting, retailing, wholesaling, education, entertainment, communications, and health care are clear examples. In manufacturing, knowledge-based activities – like R&D, product design, process design, logistics, marketing research, marketing, advertising, distribution, and customer service @ also dominate the value-added chain of most companies (see Exhibit 1).

在服務(wù)業(yè)，占美國(guó)所有就業(yè)崗位的79%和所有附加值的76%，智力投入幾乎創(chuàng)造了所有的附加值。銀行、金融服務(wù)、廣告、咨詢、會(huì)計(jì)、零售、批發(fā)、教育、娛樂、通信和醫(yī)療保健都是明顯的例子。在制造業(yè)中，以知識(shí)為基礎(chǔ)的活動(dòng)，如研發(fā)、產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)、工藝設(shè)計(jì)、物流、營(yíng)銷研究、營(yíng)銷、廣告、分銷和客戶服務(wù)，也主導(dǎo)著大多數(shù)公司的增值鏈（見附件1）。

2. Flexible, long-term platforms – capable of adaptation or evolution. Too many companies try to focus on the narrow areas where they currently excel, usually on some product-oriented skills. The real challenge is to consciously build dominating skills in areas that the customer will continue to value over time, as Motorola is doing with Its focus on “superior quality, portable communications.” The uniqueness of Toys “R” Us lies in its powerful information and distribution systems for toys, and that of State Street Boston in its advanced information and management systems for large custodial accounts.

2.靈活、長(zhǎng)期的平臺(tái)——能夠適應(yīng)或進(jìn)化。太多的公司試圖專注于他們目前擅長(zhǎng)的狹窄領(lǐng)域，通常是一些以產(chǎn)品為導(dǎo)向的技能。真正的挑戰(zhàn)是有意識(shí)地在客戶將隨著時(shí)間的推移繼續(xù)重視的領(lǐng)域建立主導(dǎo)技能，就像摩托羅拉專注于“卓越質(zhì)量的便攜式通信”所做的那樣玩具反斗城的獨(dú)特之處在于其強(qiáng)大的玩具信息和分銷系統(tǒng)，而波士頓道富的獨(dú)特之處則在于其先進(jìn)的大型托管賬戶信息和管理系統(tǒng)。

Problems occur when managers choose to concentrate too narrowly on products (as computer companies did on hardware) or too inflexibly on formats and skills that no longer match customer needs (as FotoMat and numerous department stores did). Flexible skill sets and constant, conscious reassessment of trends are hallmarks of successful core competency strategies.

當(dāng)經(jīng)理們選擇過于狹隘地專注于產(chǎn)品（就像計(jì)算機(jī)公司在硬件上所做的那樣）或過于死板地專注于不再符合客戶需求的格式和技能（就像FotoMat和許多百貨公司所做的一樣）時(shí)，就會(huì)出現(xiàn)問題。靈活的技能組合和對(duì)趨勢(shì)的持續(xù)、有意識(shí)的重新評(píng)估是成功的核心能力戰(zhàn)略的標(biāo)志。

3. Limited in number. Most companies target two or three (not one and rarely more than five) activities in the value chain most critical to future success. For example, 3M concentrates on four critical technologies in great depth and supports these with a peerless innovation system. As work becomes more complex, and the opportunities to excel in many detailed activities proliferate, managers find they cannot be best at every activity in the value chain. As they go beyond three to five activities or skill sets, they are unable to match the performance of their more focused competitors or suppliers.

3.數(shù)量有限。大多數(shù)公司的目標(biāo)是價(jià)值鏈中對(duì)未來成功最關(guān)鍵的兩到三項(xiàng)（不是一項(xiàng)，很少超過五項(xiàng)）活動(dòng)。例如，3M公司深入研究四項(xiàng)關(guān)鍵技術(shù)，并以無與倫比的創(chuàng)新體系為其提供支持。隨著工作變得越來越復(fù)雜，在許多詳細(xì)活動(dòng)中脫穎而出的機(jī)會(huì)越來越多，管理者發(fā)現(xiàn)他們不可能在價(jià)值鏈中的每一項(xiàng)活動(dòng)中都做到最好。當(dāng)他們超過三到五項(xiàng)活動(dòng)或技能時(shí)，他們無法與更專注的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手或供應(yīng)商的表現(xiàn)相匹配。

Each skill set requires intensity and management dedication that cannot tolerate dilution. It is hard to imagine Microsoft’s top managers taking their enthusiasm and skills in software into, say, chip design or even large-scale training in software usage. And if they did, what would be the cost of their loss of attention on software development?

每一項(xiàng)技能都需要強(qiáng)度和管理奉獻(xiàn)精神，不能被稀釋。很難想象微軟的高層管理人員會(huì)把他們?cè)谲浖矫娴臒崆楹图寄芡度氲叫酒O(shè)計(jì)甚至大規(guī)模的軟件使用培訓(xùn)中。如果他們這樣做了，他們對(duì)軟件開發(fā)失去關(guān)注的代價(jià)是什么？

4. Unique sources of leverage in the value chain. Effective strategies seek out places where there are market imperfections or knowledge gaps that the company is uniquely qualified to fill and where investments in intellectual resources can be highly leveraged. Raychem and Intel concentrate on depth in design and on highly specialized test-feedback systems supporting carefully selected knowledge-based products – not on volume production of standardized products – to jump over the experience curve advantages of their larger competitors. Morgan Stanley, through its TAPS system, and Bear Stearns, through its integrated bond-trading programs, have developed in-depth knowledge bases creating unique intellectual advantages and profitability in their highly competitive markets.

4.價(jià)值鏈中獨(dú)特的杠桿來源。有效的戰(zhàn)略尋找存在市場(chǎng)缺陷或知識(shí)空白的地方，這些地方是公司唯一有資格填補(bǔ)的，并且可以高度利用對(duì)知識(shí)資源的投資。Raychem和Intel專注于深度設(shè)計(jì)和高度專業(yè)化的測(cè)試反饋系統(tǒng)，支持精心選擇的基于知識(shí)的產(chǎn)品，而不是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化產(chǎn)品的批量生產(chǎn)，以超越其大型競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的經(jīng)驗(yàn)曲線優(yōu)勢(shì)。摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）通過其TAPS系統(tǒng)和貝爾斯登（Bear Stearns）通過其綜合債券交易計(jì)劃，開發(fā)了深入的知識(shí)庫(kù)，在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈的市場(chǎng)中創(chuàng)造了獨(dú)特的智力優(yōu)勢(shì)和盈利能力。

5. Areas where the company can dominate. Companies consistently make more money than their competitors only if they can perform some activities – which are important to customers – more effectively than anyone else. True focus in strategy means the capacity to bring more power to bear on a selected sector than any competitor can. Once, this meant owning and managing all the elements in the value chain supporting a specific product or service in a selected market position. Today, however, some outside supplier, by specializing in the specific skills and technologies underlying a single element in the value chain, can become more proficient at that activity than virtually any company spreading its efforts over the whole value chain.

5.公司可以占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位的領(lǐng)域。只有當(dāng)公司能夠比其他任何人更有效地開展一些對(duì)客戶很重要的活動(dòng)時(shí)，公司才能始終比競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手賺更多的錢。真正的戰(zhàn)略重點(diǎn)意味著比任何競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手都更有能力為選定的行業(yè)帶來更多的力量。曾經(jīng)，這意味著在選定的市場(chǎng)地位上擁有和管理價(jià)值鏈中支持特定產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的所有元素。然而，今天，一些外部供應(yīng)商通過專門研究?jī)r(jià)值鏈中單個(gè)元素背后的特定技能和技術(shù)，可以比任何在整個(gè)價(jià)值鏈上努力的公司更精通這項(xiàng)活動(dòng)。

In essence, each company is in competition with all potential suppliers of each activity in its value chain. Hence, it must benchmark its selected core competencies against all other potential suppliers of that activity and continue to build these core capabilities until it is demonstrably best. Thus the basic nature of strategic analysis changes from an industry analysis perspective to a horizontal analysis of capabilities across all potential providers of an activity, regardless of which industry the provider might be in.

從本質(zhì)上講，每家公司都在與其價(jià)值鏈中每項(xiàng)活動(dòng)的所有潛在供應(yīng)商競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。因此，它必須將其選定的核心能力與該活動(dòng)的所有其他潛在供應(yīng)商進(jìn)行比較，并繼續(xù)建設(shè)這些核心能力，直到它明顯達(dá)到最佳水平。因此，戰(zhàn)略分析的基本性質(zhì)從行業(yè)分析的角度轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閷?duì)活動(dòng)的所有潛在提供者的能力的橫向分析，無論提供者可能在哪個(gè)行業(yè)。

6. Elements important to customers in the long run. At least one of the firm’s core competencies should normally relate directly to understanding and serving its customers – that is, the right half of the value chain in Exhibit 1. Hi-tech companies with the world’s best state-of-the-art technology often fail when they ignore this caveat. On the other hand, Merck matches its superb basic research with a prescription drug marketing knowhow that is equally outstanding.

6.從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來看，對(duì)客戶很重要的因素。公司的至少一項(xiàng)核心能力通常應(yīng)與理解和服務(wù)客戶直接相關(guān)，即附表1中價(jià)值鏈的右半部分。擁有世界上最先進(jìn)技術(shù)的高科技公司如果忽視這一警告，往往會(huì)失敗。另一方面，默克公司將其卓越的基礎(chǔ)研究與同樣出色的處方藥營(yíng)銷技術(shù)相匹配。

By aggressively analyzing its customers, value chains, a company can often identify where it can specialize and provide an activity at lower cost or more effectively to the customer. Such analyses have created whole new Industries, like the specialized mortgage broker, syndication, secondary market, transaction-processing, escrow, title search, and insurance businesses that have now taken over these risks and functions for banks and have disaggregated the entire mortgage industry.

通過積極分析其客戶和價(jià)值鏈，公司通常可以確定其可以在哪里進(jìn)行專業(yè)化，并以更低的成本或更有效地向客戶提供活動(dòng)。這些分析創(chuàng)造了全新的行業(yè)，如專業(yè)抵押貸款經(jīng)紀(jì)人、銀團(tuán)貸款、二級(jí)市場(chǎng)、交易處理、托管、產(chǎn)權(quán)搜索和保險(xiǎn)業(yè)務(wù)，這些業(yè)務(wù)現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)為銀行接管了這些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和職能，并對(duì)整個(gè)抵押貸款行業(yè)進(jìn)行了細(xì)分。

7. Embedded in the organizations systems. Maintainable competencies cannot depend on one or two talented stars – such as Steven Jobs and Stephen Wozniak at Apple or Herbert Boyer and Arthur D. Riggs at Genentech – whose departure could destroy a company’s success. Instead, the firm must convert these competencies into a corporate reputation or culture that outlives the stars. Especially when a strategy is heavily dependent on creativity, personal dedication, and initiative or on attracting top-flight professionals, core competencies must be captured within the company’s systems – broadly defined to include its values, organization structures, and management systems.

7.嵌入組織系統(tǒng)?？删S持的能力不能依賴于一兩位才華橫溢的明星——比如蘋果公司的史蒂文·喬布斯和斯蒂芬·沃茲尼亞克，或者基因泰克公司的赫伯特·博伊爾和亞瑟·D·里格斯——他們的離開可能會(huì)毀掉一家公司的成功。相反，公司必須將這些能力轉(zhuǎn)化為比明星更長(zhǎng)壽的企業(yè)聲譽(yù)或文化。尤其是當(dāng)一項(xiàng)戰(zhàn)略在很大程度上依賴于創(chuàng)造力、個(gè)人奉獻(xiàn)精神和主動(dòng)性或吸引頂級(jí)專業(yè)人士時(shí)，必須在公司的體系中獲取核心能力——廣義上定義為包括其價(jià)值觀、組織結(jié)構(gòu)和管理體系。

Such competencies might include recruiting (McKinsey, Goldman Sachs), training (McDonald’s, Disney), marketing Procter Gamble, Hallmark), innovation (Sony, 3M), motivation systems (ServiceMaster), or control of remote and diverse operating sites within a common framework and philosophy (Exxon, CRA, Inc.). These systems are often at the heart of consistent superior performance; in many cases, a firm’s systems become its core competencies.(12)

這些能力可能包括招聘（麥肯錫、高盛）、培訓(xùn)（麥當(dāng)勞、迪士尼）、營(yíng)銷寶潔、霍爾馬克）、創(chuàng)新（索尼、3M）、激勵(lì)系統(tǒng)（ServiceMaster），或在共同的框架和理念內(nèi)控制遠(yuǎn)程和多樣化的運(yùn)營(yíng)場(chǎng)所（?？松?、CRA、股份有限公司）。這些系統(tǒng)往往是始終如一的卓越性能的核心；在許多情況下，企業(yè)的系統(tǒng)成為其核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。(12)

Preeminence: The key strategic barrier

卓越：關(guān)鍵的戰(zhàn)略障礙

For Its selected core competencies, the company must ensure that it maintains absolute preeminence. It may also need to surround these core competencies with defensive positions, both upstream and downstream. In some cases, it may have to perform some activities where it is not best-in-world, just to keep existing or potential competitors from learning, taking over, eroding, or bypassing elements of its special competencies. In fact, managers should consciously develop these core competencies to block competitors strategically and avoid outsourcing them or giving suppliers access to the critical knowledge bases or skills that underpin them.

對(duì)于其選定的核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，公司必須確保保持絕對(duì)的優(yōu)勢(shì)。它可能還需要用上游和下游的防御陣地來圍繞這些核心能力。在某些情況下，它可能不得不在世界上不是最好的地方進(jìn)行一些活動(dòng)，只是為了防止現(xiàn)有或潛在的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手學(xué)習(xí)、接管、侵蝕或繞過其特殊能力的要素。事實(shí)上，管理者應(yīng)該有意識(shí)地發(fā)展這些核心能力，以從戰(zhàn)略上阻止競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，避免將其外包或讓供應(yīng)商獲得支撐其的關(guān)鍵知識(shí)庫(kù)或技能。

Honda, for example, does all its engine R&D in-house and makes all the critical parts for its small motor design core competency in closely controlled facilities in Japan. It will consider outsourcing any other noncritical elements in its products, but builds a careful strategic block around this most essential element for all its businesses.(13) Most important, as a company’s preeminence in selected fields grows, its knowledge-based core competencies become ever harder to overtake. Knowledge bases tend to grow exponentially in value with Investment and experience. Intellectual leadership tends to attract the most talented people, who then work on and solve the most interesting problems. The combination in turn creates higher returns and attracts the next round of outstanding talent. In addition to the examples we have already cited, organizations as diverse as Bechtel, AT&T Bell Labs, Microsoft, Boeing, Intel, Merck, Genentech, McKinsey, Arthur Andersen, Sony, Nike, Nintendo, Bankers Trust, and Mayo Clinic have found this to be true.

例如，本田的所有發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)研發(fā)都是在內(nèi)部進(jìn)行的，并在日本的嚴(yán)格控制的工廠中生產(chǎn)其小型電機(jī)設(shè)計(jì)核心能力的所有關(guān)鍵零部件。它將考慮外包其產(chǎn)品中的任何其他非關(guān)鍵元素，但圍繞這一最重要的元素為其所有業(yè)務(wù)構(gòu)建一個(gè)謹(jǐn)慎的戰(zhàn)略區(qū)塊。（13） 最重要的是，隨著一家公司在特定領(lǐng)域的卓越地位不斷提高，其以知識(shí)為基礎(chǔ)的核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力變得越來越難以超越。隨著投資和經(jīng)驗(yàn)的增加，知識(shí)庫(kù)的價(jià)值往往呈指數(shù)級(jí)增長(zhǎng)。智慧型領(lǐng)導(dǎo)往往會(huì)吸引最有才華的人，然后他們會(huì)致力于解決最有趣的問題。這種組合反過來又創(chuàng)造了更高的回報(bào)，并吸引了下一輪的杰出人才。除了我們已經(jīng)列舉的例子外，柏克德、AT&T貝爾實(shí)驗(yàn)室、微軟、波音、英特爾、默克、基因泰克、麥肯錫、安達(dá)信、索尼、耐克、任天堂、銀行家信托和梅奧診所等各種組織都發(fā)現(xiàn)這是真的。

Some executives regard core activities as those the company is continuously engaged in, while peripheral activities are those that are intermittent and therefore can be outsourced. From a strategic outsourcing viewpoint, however, core competencies are the activities that offer long-term competitive advantage and thus must be rigidly controlled and protected. Peripheral activities are those not critical to the company’s competitive edge.

一些高管將核心活動(dòng)視為公司持續(xù)從事的活動(dòng)，而外圍活動(dòng)則是間歇性的，因此可以外包。然而，從戰(zhàn)略外包的角度來看，核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力是提供長(zhǎng)期競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的活動(dòng)，因此必須嚴(yán)格控制和保護(hù)。外圍活動(dòng)是那些對(duì)公司的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)并不重要的活動(dòng)。

Strategic outsourcing 戰(zhàn)略外包

If supplier markets were totally reliable and efficient, rational companies would outsource everything except those special activities in which they could achieve a unique competitive edge, that is, their core competencies. Unfortunately, most supplier markets are, imperfect and do entails some risks for both buyer and seller with respect to price, quality, time, or other key dimensions. Moreover, outsourcing entails unique transaction costs – searching, contracting, controlling, and recontracting – that at times may exceed the transaction costs of having the activity directly under management’s in-house control.

如果供應(yīng)商市場(chǎng)是完全可靠和高效的，理性的公司就會(huì)外包一切，除了那些他們可以獲得獨(dú)特競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的特殊活動(dòng)，即他們的核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。不幸的是，大多數(shù)供應(yīng)商市場(chǎng)都是不完美的，確實(shí)會(huì)給買方和賣方帶來價(jià)格、質(zhì)量、時(shí)間或其他關(guān)鍵方面的一些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。此外，外包需要獨(dú)特的交易成本——搜索、簽約、控制和重新簽約——有時(shí)可能超過將活動(dòng)直接置于管理層內(nèi)部控制之下的交易成本。

To address these difficulties, managers must answer three key questions about any activity considered for outsourcing. First, what is the potential for obtaining competitive advantage in this activity, taking account of transaction costs? Second, what is the potential vulnerability that could arise from market failure if the activity is outsourced? Conceptually, these two factors ca n be arrayed In a simple matrix . Third, what can we do to alleviate our vulnerability by structuring arrangements with suppliers to afford appropriate controls yet provide for necessary flexibilities in demand?

為了解決這些困難，管理人員必須回答關(guān)于外包活動(dòng)的三個(gè)關(guān)鍵問題。首先，考慮到交易成本，在這項(xiàng)活動(dòng)中獲得競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的潛力是什么？第二，如果活動(dòng)外包，市場(chǎng)失靈可能導(dǎo)致的潛在漏洞是什么？從概念上講，這兩個(gè)因素可以排列在一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的矩陣中。第三，我們能做些什么來減輕我們的脆弱性，通過與供應(yīng)商建立安排，提供適當(dāng)?shù)目刂?，同時(shí)提供必要的需求靈活性？

The two extremes in exhibit 2 are relatively straightforward. When the potential for both competitive edge and strategic vulnerability is high, the company needs a high degree of control, usually entailing production internally or through joint ownership arrangements or tight long-term contracts (explicit or implicity).

圖表2中的兩個(gè)極端相對(duì)簡(jiǎn)單。當(dāng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)和戰(zhàn)略脆弱性的潛力都很高時(shí)，公司需要高度的控制，通常需要內(nèi)部或通過共同所有權(quán)安排或嚴(yán)格的長(zhǎng)期合同（明示或默示）進(jìn)行生產(chǎn)。

Marks’k Spencer, for example, is famous for its network of tied suppliers, which create the unique brands and styles that underpin the retailer’s value reputation. Spot suppliers would be too unreliable and unlikely to meet the demanding standards that are Marks & Spencer’s unique consumer franchise. Hence, close control of product quality, design, technology, and equipment through contracts and even financial support is essential.

例如，Marks’k Spencer以其捆綁供應(yīng)商網(wǎng)絡(luò)而聞名，這些供應(yīng)商創(chuàng)造了支撐零售商價(jià)值聲譽(yù)的獨(dú)特品牌和風(fēng)格?，F(xiàn)貨供應(yīng)商太不可靠，不太可能達(dá)到瑪莎百貨獨(dú)特的消費(fèi)者特許經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)所要求的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。因此，通過合同甚至財(cái)政支持對(duì)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量、設(shè)計(jì)、技術(shù)和設(shè)備進(jìn)行密切控制至關(guān)重要。

The opposite case is perhaps office cleaning, where little competitive edge is usually possible and there is an active and deep market of supplier firms. In between, there is a continuous range of activities requiring different degrees of control and strategic flexibility.

相反的情況可能是辦公室清潔，那里通常沒有什么競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，而且有一個(gè)活躍而深入的供應(yīng)商公司市場(chǎng)。在這兩者之間，有一系列持續(xù)的活動(dòng)需要不同程度的控制和戰(zhàn)略靈活性。

At each Intervening point, the question is not just whether to make or buy, but how to implement a desired balance between independence and incentives for the supplier versus control and security for the buyer. Most companies will benefit by extending outsourcing first in less critical areas, or in parts of activities, like payroll, rather than all of accounting. As they gain experience, they may increase profit opportunities greatly by outsourcing more critical activities to noncompeting firms that can perform them more effectively independence and incentl,v

在每一個(gè)干預(yù)點(diǎn)上，問題不僅僅是制造還是購(gòu)買，而是如何在供應(yīng)商的獨(dú)立性和激勵(lì)性與買方的控制和安全性之間實(shí)現(xiàn)預(yù)期的平衡。大多數(shù)公司將受益于將外包首先擴(kuò)展到不太關(guān)鍵的領(lǐng)域，或擴(kuò)展到工資等部分活動(dòng)，而不是全部會(huì)計(jì)。隨著他們獲得經(jīng)驗(yàn)，他們可能會(huì)通過將更關(guān)鍵的活動(dòng)外包給不具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的公司來大大增加利潤(rùn)機(jī)會(huì)，這些公司可以更有效地獨(dú)立和激勵(lì)他們

In a few cases, more complex alliances with competitors may be essential to garner specialized skills that cannot be obtained in other ways. At each level, the company must isolate and rigorously control strategically critical relationships between its suppliers and its customers.

在少數(shù)情況下，與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手建立更復(fù)雜的聯(lián)盟可能對(duì)獲得其他方式無法獲得的專業(yè)技能至關(guān)重要。在每一個(gè)層面上，公司都必須隔離并嚴(yán)格控制供應(yīng)商和客戶之間的戰(zhàn)略關(guān)鍵關(guān)系。

Competitive edge 競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)

The key strategic issue in insourcing versus outsourcing is whether a company can achieve a maintainable competitive edge by performing an activity internally – usually cheaper, better, in a more timely fashion, or with some unique capability – on a continuing basis. If one or more of these dimensions is critical to the customer and if the company can perform that function uniquely well, the activity should be kept in-house. Many companies unfortunately assume that because they have historically performed an activity internally, or because it seems integral to their business, the activity should be insourced. However, on closer investigation and with careful benchmarking, a company’s internal capabilities may turn out to be significantly below those of best-in-world suppliers.

內(nèi)包與外包的關(guān)鍵戰(zhàn)略問題是，一家公司能否通過在內(nèi)部持續(xù)開展活動(dòng)（通常更便宜、更好、更及時(shí)或具有一些獨(dú)特的能力）來獲得可維持的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。如果這些維度中的一個(gè)或多個(gè)對(duì)客戶至關(guān)重要，并且公司能夠非常好地履行這一職能，則應(yīng)將活動(dòng)保留在內(nèi)部。不幸的是，許多公司認(rèn)為，因?yàn)樗麄儦v史上曾在內(nèi)部開展過一項(xiàng)活動(dòng)，或者因?yàn)檫@似乎是其業(yè)務(wù)不可或缺的一部分，所以該活動(dòng)應(yīng)該是外包的。然而，經(jīng)過更仔細(xì)的調(diào)查和仔細(xì)的基準(zhǔn)測(cè)試，一家公司的內(nèi)部能力可能會(huì)大大低于世界上最好的供應(yīng)商。

Ford Motor Company, for example, found that many of its Internal suppliers’ quality practices and costs were nowhere near those of external suppliers when it began its famous “best in class” worldwide benchmarking studies on 400 subassemblies for the new Taurus-Sable line. A New York bank with extensive worldwide operations Investigated why its Federal Express costs were soaring and found that its Internal mall department took two days more than Federal Express to get a letter or package from the third floor to the fortieth floor of Its building.

例如，福特汽車公司（Ford Motor Company）在開始對(duì)新Taurus Sable生產(chǎn)線的400個(gè)組件進(jìn)行著名的“同類最佳”全球基準(zhǔn)研究時(shí)，發(fā)現(xiàn)其許多內(nèi)部供應(yīng)商的質(zhì)量實(shí)踐和成本與外部供應(yīng)商相去甚遠(yuǎn)。一家在全球擁有廣泛業(yè)務(wù)的紐約銀行調(diào)查了其聯(lián)邦快遞成本飆升的原因，發(fā)現(xiàn)其內(nèi)部購(gòu)物中心部門比聯(lián)邦快遞多花了兩天時(shí)間才能將信件或包裹從其大樓的三樓送到四十樓。

In interviews about benchmarking with top operating managers in both service and manufacturing companies, we frequently encountered some paraphrase of “We thought we were the best in the world at many activities. But when we benchmarked against the best external suppliers, we found we were not even up to the worst of the benchmarking cases.”

在與服務(wù)業(yè)和制造業(yè)公司的頂級(jí)運(yùn)營(yíng)經(jīng)理進(jìn)行基準(zhǔn)測(cè)試的采訪中，我們經(jīng)常會(huì)遇到這樣的說法：“我們認(rèn)為自己在許多活動(dòng)中都是世界上最好的。但當(dāng)我們與最好的外部供應(yīng)商進(jìn)行基準(zhǔn)測(cè)試時(shí)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)自己甚至達(dá)不到最糟糕的基準(zhǔn)測(cè)試?！?/p>

Transaction costs

交易成本

In all calculations, analysts must include internal transaction costs as well as those associated with external sourcing. If the company is to produce the item or service internally on a long-term basis, it must back up its decision with continuing R&D, personnel development, and infrastructure investments that at least match those of the best external supplier; otherwise, it will lose its competitive edge over time. Managers often tend to overlook such backup costs, as well as the losses from laggard innovation and unresponsiveness of internal groups that know they have a guaranteed market.

在所有計(jì)算中，分析師必須包括內(nèi)部交易成本以及與外部來源相關(guān)的成本。如果公司要在內(nèi)部長(zhǎng)期生產(chǎn)產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)，則必須通過持續(xù)的研發(fā)、人員發(fā)展和基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資來支持其決定，這些投資至少與最佳外部供應(yīng)商的投資相匹配；否則，隨著時(shí)間的推移，它將失去競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。管理者往往會(huì)忽視這種備份成本，以及創(chuàng)新落后和內(nèi)部團(tuán)隊(duì)反應(yīng)遲鈍造成的損失，因?yàn)樗麄冎雷约河幸粋€(gè)有保障的市場(chǎng)。

Finally, there are the headquarters and support costs of constantly managing the insourced activity. One of the great gains of outsourcing is the decrease in executive time spent managing peripheral activities – freeing top management to focus more on the core of Its business.

最后，還有不斷管理外包活動(dòng)的總部和支助費(fèi)用。外包的一大好處是減少了高管管理外圍活動(dòng)的時(shí)間，使高層管理人員能夠更多地專注于其核心業(yè)務(wù)。

Various studies have shown that when these internal transaction costs are thoroughly analyzed, they can be extremely high.(14) Since it is easier to identify the explicit transaction costs of dealing with external suppliers, these generally tend to be included in analyses. Harder-to-identify internal transaction costs, however, are often not included, thus biasing results.

各種研究表明，當(dāng)對(duì)這些內(nèi)部交易成本進(jìn)行徹底分析時(shí)，它們可能會(huì)非常高。（14） 由于更容易確定與外部供應(yīng)商打交道的明確交易成本，這些成本通常會(huì)包含在分析中。然而，難以確定的內(nèi)部交易成本往往不包括在內(nèi)，從而使結(jié)果產(chǎn)生偏差。

Vulnerability 弱點(diǎn)

When there are many suppliers with adequate but not dominating scale) and mature market standards and terms, a potential buyer is unlikely to be more efficient than the best available supplier. If, on the other hand, there is not sufficient depth in the market, overly powerful suppliers can hold the company ransom. Conversely, if the number of suppliers is limited or individual suppliers are too weak, they may be unable to supply innovative products or services as well as a much larger buyer could by performing the activity in-house. While the activity or product might not be one of its core competencies, the company might nevertheless benefit by producing internally rather than undertaking the training, investment, and codesign expenses necessary to bring weak suppliers up to needed performance levels.

當(dāng)有許多供應(yīng)商具有足夠但不占主導(dǎo)地位的規(guī)模）和成熟的市場(chǎng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和條款時(shí)，潛在買家不太可能比現(xiàn)有的最佳供應(yīng)商更有效率。另一方面，如果市場(chǎng)沒有足夠的深度，過于強(qiáng)大的供應(yīng)商可能會(huì)勒索公司。相反，如果供應(yīng)商數(shù)量有限或個(gè)別供應(yīng)商過于薄弱，他們可能無法提供創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)，而更大的買家則無法通過內(nèi)部活動(dòng)提供創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)。雖然活動(dòng)或產(chǎn)品可能不是其核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力之一，但公司可能會(huì)通過內(nèi)部生產(chǎn)而受益，而不是承擔(dān)必要的培訓(xùn)、投資和代碼設(shè)計(jì)費(fèi)用，以使薄弱的供應(yīng)商達(dá)到所需的績(jī)效水平。

Another form of vulnerability is the lack of information available in the marketplace or from individual suppliers., for example, a supplier may secretly expect labor disruptions or raw material problems, but hide these concerns until it is too late for the customer to go elsewhere. A related problem occurs when a supplier has unique information capabilities: for example, large wholesalers or retailers, market research firms, software companies, or legal specialists may have information or fact-gathering systems that would be impossible for the buyer or any other single supplier to reproduce efficiently. Such suppliers may be able to charge what are essentially monopoly prices, but purchasing from them could still be less costly than reproducing the service Internally. In other cases, there may be many capable suppliers (for example, in R&D or software), but the costs of adequately monitoring progress on the suppliers, premises might make outsourcing prohibitive.

另一種形式的漏洞是缺乏市場(chǎng)上或個(gè)別供應(yīng)商提供的信息。，例如，供應(yīng)商可能會(huì)暗中預(yù)期勞動(dòng)力中斷或原材料問題，但會(huì)隱瞞這些擔(dān)憂，直到客戶去其他地方為時(shí)已晚。當(dāng)供應(yīng)商具有獨(dú)特的信息能力時(shí)，就會(huì)出現(xiàn)相關(guān)問題：例如，大型批發(fā)商或零售商、市場(chǎng)研究公司、軟件公司或法律專家可能擁有買方或任何其他供應(yīng)商無法有效復(fù)制的信息或事實(shí)收集系統(tǒng)。這些供應(yīng)商可能能夠收取基本上壟斷的價(jià)格，但從他們那里購(gòu)買服務(wù)的成本仍然低于在內(nèi)部復(fù)制服務(wù)的成本。在其他情況下，可能有許多有能力的供應(yīng)商（例如，在研發(fā)或軟件方面），但充分監(jiān)測(cè)供應(yīng)商進(jìn)展的成本可能會(huì)使外包望而卻步。

Sometimes the whole structure of information in an industry will militate for or against outsourcing. Computing, for example, was largely kept in-house in Its early years because the information available to a buyer of computing services and Its ability to make judgments about such services were very different for the buying company (which knew very little) than for the supplier (which had excellent information). Many buyers lacked the competency either to assess or to monitor sellers, and feared loss of vital information. A company can outsource computing more easily today, in part because buyers, computer, technical management, and software knowhow are sufficient to make informed judgments about external suppliers.

有時(shí)，一個(gè)行業(yè)的整個(gè)信息結(jié)構(gòu)都會(huì)支持或反對(duì)外包。例如，計(jì)算機(jī)在其早期主要保留在內(nèi)部，因?yàn)橛?jì)算機(jī)服務(wù)購(gòu)買者可獲得的信息及其對(duì)此類服務(wù)做出判斷的能力與購(gòu)買公司（知之甚少）和供應(yīng)商（信息豐富）截然不同。許多買家缺乏評(píng)估或監(jiān)控賣家的能力，并擔(dān)心丟失重要信息。如今，一家公司可以更容易地將計(jì)算外包，部分原因是買家、計(jì)算機(jī)、技術(shù)管理和軟件專業(yè)知識(shí)足以對(duì)外部供應(yīng)商做出明智的判斷。

In addition to information anomalies, Stuckey and White note three types of “asset specificity” that commonly create market imperfections, calling for controlled sourcing solutions rather than relying on efficient markets.(15) These are: (1) site specificity, where sellers have located costly fixed assets in close proximity to the buyer, thus minimizing transport and inventory costs for a single supplier; (2) technical specificity, where one or both parties must invest in equipment that can be used only by the parties in conjunction with each other and has low value, in alternative uses; and (3) human capital specificity, where employees must develop in-depth skills that are specific to a particular buyer or customer relationship.

除了信息異常，Stuckey和White還指出了三種類型的“資產(chǎn)特異性”，它們通常會(huì)造成市場(chǎng)缺陷，呼吁采用可控的采購(gòu)解決方案，而不是依賴高效的市場(chǎng)。（15） 這些是：（1）場(chǎng)地專用性，即賣方將昂貴的固定資產(chǎn)放置在買方附近，從而最大限度地減少單個(gè)供應(yīng)商的運(yùn)輸和庫(kù)存成本；（2） 技術(shù)專用性，其中一方或雙方必須投資于只能由雙方共同使用且價(jià)值較低的設(shè)備，用于替代用途；以及（3）人力資本的特殊性，即員工必須發(fā)展特定于特定買家或客戶關(guān)系的深入技能。

Stuckey and White explain the outsourcing implications of information and specificity problems in the case of a bauxite mine and an alumina refiner. Refineries are usually located close to mines because of the high cost of transporting bauxite, relative to Its value. Refineries in turn are tuned to process the narrow set of physical properties associated with the particular mine’s bauxite.

Stuckey和White解釋了鋁土礦和氧化鋁精煉廠的信息和特殊性問題的外包影響。煉油廠通常位于礦山附近，因?yàn)橄鄬?duì)于鋁土礦的價(jià)值，運(yùn)輸鋁土礦的成本很高。煉油廠則被調(diào)整為處理與特定礦山鋁土礦相關(guān)的一系列物理特性。

Different and highly specialized skills and assets are needed for refining versus mining. Access to Information further compounds problems., if an independent mine expects a strike, it is unlikely to share that information with its customers, unless there are strong incentives. As a result, the aluminum industry has moved toward vertical integration or strong bilateral joint ventures, as opposed to open outsourcing of bauxite supplies – despite the apparent presence of a commodity product and many suppliers and sellers. In this case, issues of both competitive advantage and potential market failure dictate a higher degree of sourcing control.

精煉和采礦需要不同的高度專業(yè)化的技能和資產(chǎn)。獲取信息進(jìn)一步加劇了問題。，如果一家獨(dú)立礦山預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)發(fā)生罷工，它不太可能與客戶分享這些信息，除非有強(qiáng)有力的激勵(lì)措施。因此，鋁行業(yè)已轉(zhuǎn)向垂直整合或強(qiáng)大的雙邊合資企業(yè)，而不是公開外包鋁土礦供應(yīng)——盡管明顯存在大宗商品和許多供應(yīng)商和銷售商。在這種情況下，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)和潛在市場(chǎng)失敗的問題要求更高程度的采購(gòu)控制。

Degree of source control 源頭控制程度

In deciding on a sourcing strategy for a particular segment of their business, managers have a wide range of control options the Exhibits 3 and 4 for the most basic). Where there is high potential both for vulnerability and for competitive edge, tight control is indicated (as in the bauxite case). At the opposite end is, say, office cleaning. Between these extremes are opportunities for developing special incentives or more complex oversight contracts to balance intermediate levels of vulnerability against more moderate prospects for competitive edge. Nike’s multi-tier strategy offers an interesting example.

在決定其特定業(yè)務(wù)部門的采購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略時(shí)，經(jīng)理們有廣泛的控制選擇（最基本的是附表3和4）。在脆弱性和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)都有很大潛力的地方，需要嚴(yán)格控制（如鋁土礦）。另一端是，比如說，辦公室清潔。在這些極端之間，有機(jī)會(huì)制定特殊激勵(lì)措施或更復(fù)雜的監(jiān)督合同，以平衡中等程度的脆弱性和更溫和的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)前景。耐克的多層戰(zhàn)略提供了一個(gè)有趣的例子。

The practice and law of strategic alliances are rapidly developing new ways to deal with common control issues – by establishing specified procedures that permit direct involvement in limited stages of a partner’s activities, without incurring either ownership arrangements or the loss of control inherent ln arm’s-length transactions.

戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟的實(shí)踐和法律正在迅速發(fā)展新的方法來處理共同的控制問題——通過建立特定的程序，允許直接參與合作伙伴活動(dòng)的有限階段，而不會(huì)產(chǎn)生所有權(quán)安排或失去公平交易中固有的控制權(quán)。

Flexibility versus control 靈活性與控制

Within this framework, there is a constant tradeoff between flexibility and control. One of the main purposes of outsourcing is to have the supplier assume certain classes of investment and risk, such as demand variability. To optimize costs, the buying company may want to maintain its internal capacity at re atively constant levels despite highly fluctuating sales demands. Under these circumstances, it needs a surge strategy.

在這個(gè)框架內(nèi)，靈活性和控制之間存在著不斷的權(quán)衡。外包的主要目的之一是讓供應(yīng)商承擔(dān)某些類別的投資和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，例如需求可變性。為了優(yōu)化成本，盡管銷售需求波動(dòng)很大，但采購(gòu)公司可能希望將其內(nèi)部產(chǎn)能保持在相對(duì)恒定的水平。在這種情況下，它需要一個(gè)增兵戰(zhàn)略。

McDonald’s, for example, with $8billion in sales and 10.1 percent growth per year, needs to call in part-time and casual workers to handle extensive daily variations yet also be able to select its future permanent or managerial personnel from these people. IBM has had the opposite problem, since its core demand has been declining, the company has had to lay off employees. Yet it needs surge capacity for: (1) quick access to some former employees, basic skills; (2) available production capacity without the costs of supporting facilities full time; and (3) the ability to exploit strong outside parties’ specialized capabilities through temporary consortia – for example, in applications software, microprocessors, network development, or factory automation.

例如，麥當(dāng)勞的銷售額為80億美元，每年增長(zhǎng)10.1%，它需要招聘兼職和臨時(shí)工來處理大量的日常變化，同時(shí)也能夠從這些人中選擇未來的長(zhǎng)期或管理人員。IBM遇到了相反的問題，由于其核心需求一直在下降，該公司不得不裁員。然而，它需要激增的能力：（1）快速接觸一些前員工，掌握基本技能；（2） 可用的生產(chǎn)能力，無需全職配套設(shè)施的成本；以及（3）通過臨時(shí)聯(lián)盟利用強(qiáng)大的外部方專業(yè)能力的能力，例如在應(yīng)用軟件、微處理器、網(wǎng)絡(luò)開發(fā)或工廠自動(dòng)化方面。

Strategically, McDonald’s has created a pool of people available on “call options,” while IBM – through spinouts of factories with baseload commitments to IBM, guaranteed consulting employment for key people, flexible joint venturts, and strategic alliances – has created ” put options” to handle surge needs as it downsizes and tries to turn around its business. There is a full spectrum of outsourcing arrangements, depending on the company’s control and flexibility needs (see Exhibit 4). The issue is less whether to make or buy an activity than it is how to structure internal versus external sourcing on an optimal basis. Companies are outsourcing much more of what used to be considered either integral elements of their value chains or necessary staff activities. Because of greater complexity, higher specialization, and new technological capabilities, outside suppliers can now perform many such activities at lower cost and with higher value-added than a fully integrated company can.

從戰(zhàn)略上講，麥當(dāng)勞已經(jīng)建立了一個(gè)可供選擇的人才庫(kù)，而IBM——通過對(duì)IBM做出基本負(fù)荷承諾的工廠的分拆，保證關(guān)鍵人員的咨詢就業(yè)，靈活的合資企業(yè)，以及戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟——?jiǎng)?chuàng)建了“看跌期權(quán)”，以在其縮小規(guī)模并試圖扭轉(zhuǎn)業(yè)務(wù)時(shí)應(yīng)對(duì)激增的需求。根據(jù)公司的控制和靈活性需求，有全方位的外包安排（見附件4）。問題不在于是制作還是購(gòu)買一項(xiàng)活動(dòng)，而在于如何在最佳的基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建內(nèi)部采購(gòu)與外部采購(gòu)。公司正在外包更多過去被認(rèn)為是其價(jià)值鏈不可或缺的組成部分或必要的員工活動(dòng)。由于更大的復(fù)雜性、更高的專業(yè)化程度和新的技術(shù)能力，外部供應(yīng)商現(xiàn)在可以以比完全整合的公司更低的成本和更高的附加值開展許多此類活動(dòng)。

In some cases, new production technologies have moved manufacturing economies of scale toward the supplier. In others, service technologies have lowered transaction costs substantially, making it possible to specify, transport, store, and coordinate inputs from external sources so inexpensively that the balance of benefits has shifted from insourcing to outsourcing. In certain specialized niches, outside companies have grown to such size and sophistication that they have developed economies of scale, scope, and knowledge intensity so formidable that neither smaller nor more integrated producers can effectively compete with them (for example, ADP Services in payroll, and ServiceMaster in maintenance). To the extent that knowledge of a specific activity is more important than knowledge of the end product itself, specialized suppliers can often produce higher value-added at lower cost for that activity than almost any integrated company.

在某些情況下，新的生產(chǎn)技術(shù)使制造業(yè)的規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)向了供應(yīng)商。在另一些情況下，服務(wù)技術(shù)大大降低了交易成本，使指定、運(yùn)輸、存儲(chǔ)和協(xié)調(diào)來自外部來源的投入變得可能，成本如此低廉，以至于利益平衡已經(jīng)從內(nèi)包轉(zhuǎn)向外包。在某些專業(yè)領(lǐng)域，外部公司的規(guī)模和復(fù)雜程度已經(jīng)發(fā)展到規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)、范圍經(jīng)濟(jì)和知識(shí)密集度如此之高，以至于規(guī)模較小或更一體化的生產(chǎn)商都無法與之有效競(jìng)爭(zhēng)（例如，工資方面的ADP服務(wù)和維護(hù)方面的ServiceMaster）。在某種程度上，特定活動(dòng)的知識(shí)比最終產(chǎn)品本身的知識(shí)更重要，專業(yè)供應(yīng)商通常可以以比幾乎任何綜合公司更低的成本為該活動(dòng)創(chuàng)造更高的附加值。

Strategic benefits versus risks 戰(zhàn)略利益與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

Too often companies look at outsourcing as a means to lower only short-term direct costs. However, through strategic outsourcing, companies can lower their long-term capital investments and leverage their key competencies significantly, as Apple and Nike have done. They can also force many types of risk and unwanted management problems onto suppliers.

公司往往將外包視為一種只降低短期直接成本的手段。然而，通過戰(zhàn)略外包，公司可以降低長(zhǎng)期資本投資，并顯著利用其關(guān)鍵能力，就像蘋果和耐克所做的那樣。它們還可能將許多類型的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和不必要的管理問題強(qiáng)加給供應(yīng)商。

Gallo, the largest producer and distributor of wines in the United States, outsources most of its grapes, pushing the risks of weather, land prices, and labor problems onto its suppliers.

加洛是美國(guó)最大的葡萄酒生產(chǎn)商和經(jīng)銷商，它將大部分葡萄外包，將天氣、地價(jià)和勞動(dòng)力問題的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)推給了供應(yīng)商。

Argyle Diamonds, one of the world’s largest diamond producers, outsources virtually all aspects of its operation except the crucial steps of separation and sorting of diamonds. It contracts all its huge earth-moving operations (to avoid capital and labor risks), its housing and food services for workers (to avoid confrontations on nonoperating issues), and much of its distribution (to De Beers to protect prices, to finance inventories, and to avoid the complications of worldwide distribution). By outsourcing to best-in-class suppliers in each case, it further ensures the quality and image of its operations.

Argyle Diamonds是世界上最大的鉆石生產(chǎn)商之一，幾乎將其運(yùn)營(yíng)的所有方面外包，但鉆石分離和分揀的關(guān)鍵步驟除外。它承包了所有大型土方作業(yè)（以避免資本和勞動(dòng)力風(fēng)險(xiǎn)）、為工人提供的住房和食品服務(wù)（以避免在非經(jīng)營(yíng)問題上發(fā)生沖突），以及大部分分銷（給戴比爾斯以保護(hù)價(jià)格、為庫(kù)存融資，并避免全球分銷的復(fù)雜性）。通過在每種情況下外包給一流的供應(yīng)商，它進(jìn)一步確保了運(yùn)營(yíng)的質(zhì)量和形象。

Important strategic benefits

重要的戰(zhàn)略利益

Strategically, outsourcing can provide the buyer with greater flexibility, especially in the purchase of rapidly developing new technologies, fashion goods, or the myriad components of complex systems. It reduces the company’s design-cycle t

從戰(zhàn)略上講，外包可以為買家提供更大的靈活性，尤其是在購(gòu)買快速發(fā)展的新技術(shù)、時(shí)尚商品或復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)的無數(shù)組件時(shí)。它減少了公司的設(shè)計(jì)周期

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